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ARTICLES
Allocation of Environmental Risk as
Between Landlords and Tenants:
The New York View
JAMES E. SCHWARTZ, ESQ., CARB LURIA COOK & KUFELD, LLP
AND
BORIS SEREBRO, ESQ., PH.D., OLONOFF ASEN & OLONOFF, LLP
Introduction
Legal publications have recently devoted extensive coverage
to the statutory framework of, and the interpretative gloss that
the courts have afforded to, the major environmental remediation
statutes applicable to real property. But while the commentators
have discussed at length environmental liability issues that arise
between seller and purchaser and borrower and lender,' they have
1. See generally J. Murray, Asbestos Legislation and Litigation Affecting Com-
mercial Buildings, 6 THE ACREL PAPERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY IN COMMERCIAL
PROPERTY TRANSACTIONS (Alan J. Robin, et al. eds., 1994), available at http://
www.firstam.com/faf/html/cust/jm-asbestos.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2002); J.
Witkin, Environmental Aspects of Real Estate Transactions, 1995 A.B.A. SEC. NAT.
RESOURCES ENERGY & ENVTL. L. AND SEC. REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. L.; G.
Rodenhausen, Negotiating the Environmental Provisions of the Transaction from the
Seller's, Buyer's and Lender's Prospective, 1999 N.Y. ST. B.A. ENVTL. L. PRAC. SKILLS;
D. Riesel et al., Recent Developments in CERCLA and Toxic Tort Litigation-Private-
Party Hazardous Material Litigation, 2000 N.Y. ST. B.A. ENVTL. L. PRAC.; D. Som-
mer, Recent Developments in CERCLA and Toxic Tort Litigation-Contribution
Claims After Bedford Affiliates v. Sills, 2000 N.Y. ST. B.A. ENVTL. L. PRAC.; F. Amo-
roso, Recent Developments in CERCLA and Toxic Tort Litigation-Protection Availa-
ble to Potential Purchasers and Developers, 2000 N.Y. ST. B.A. ENVTL. L. PRAc.; R.
Koegel, Recent Developments in CERCLA Litigation-Cost Recovery Actions and
Third-Party Defense, 2000 N.Y. ST. B.A. ENVTL. L. PRAC.; R. Herman, Recent Develop-
ments in CERCLA Litigation-Due and Don't Care Under CERCLA: An Emerging
Standard for Current Owners, 2000 N.Y. ST. B.A. ENVTL. L. PRAC.; L. Schnapf, Recent
Developments in CERCLA Litigation-Identifying and Allocating Environmental Is-
sues in Corporate and Real Estate Transactions, 2000 N.Y. ST. B.A. ENVTL. LAW
PRAC.; R. Hull, Recent Developments in CERCLA Litigation-Purchaser' Liability
Under CERCLA: Has Lashins Made Due Diligence a Detriment? 2000 N.Y. ST. B.A.
ENVTL. L. PRAC.
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barely touched upon environmental liability in the context of the
relationship of lessor and lessee.
This article will fill the gap and analyze those decisions of the
New York state courts and the federal courts sitting in New York
that have allocated environmental risk in the context of the land-
lord-tenant-subtenant relationship. It surveys decisions that have
arisen under the federal Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation and Liability Act ("CERCLA"), 2 New York
Navigation Law3 and New York City Local Law 76. 4 It concludes
that while all three statutory regimes place on the polluter ulti-
mate liability, each regime requires, with only very limited excep-
tion, the property owner-here, the landlord-to bear initial
liability for the cost of the pollution remediation, irrespective of
fault.
The landlord's bearing initial liability is not the end of the
story. Although liable, the landlord may have remedies against
the party at fault, whether a tenant, a subtenant, or another
party, either based upon the statute itself or pursuant to contract
(e.g., the lease). If the owner is "innocent," that is, cast in primary
liability only because of its status as an owner, it will have a stat-
utory action against the actual polluter for contribution, but not
indemnification. 5 And, if the lease sufficiently provides for the
complete transfer of liability to the tenant, the landlord will have
a contractual indemnity claim.6
In some respects a landlord-tenant relationship is similar to
that between sellers and buyers of real property. Both the buyer
and the tenant take possession of the property; however, in con-
trast to an acquisition, a real property lease affords the tenant
only temporary, and potentially restricted, control over the prop-
erty. Thus, in the majority of the environmental cases arising in
the context of a landlord-tenant relationship, courts put special
emphasis on determining who during the term of the lease has
power to control the leased property. 7 Is it the landlord? The ten-
ant? Or even the subtenant? Ultimately, liability flows from con-
trol. The analysis that follows assumes that the reader has
2. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act,
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2001) amended by Pub. L. No. 107-118, 115 Stat. 2356 (2002).
3. N.Y. NAv. LAw § 1-204 (2001).
4. N.Y. CiTy LOCAL LAW No. 76 (1985).
5. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(e) (2001).
6. Id.
7. See, e.g., Commander Oil Corp. v. Barlo Equip. Corp., 215 F.3d 321 (2d Cir.
2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 979 (2000).
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general familiarity with each of the three statutory frameworks
discussed.
CERCLA
Under CERCLA section 107(a),8 an owner/landlord is strictly
liable for response costs with only very limited exceptions. Status
alone-that is, mere ownership of property on which the release
occurs-triggers liability, regardless of any control over the dispo-
sal activities.9 Thus, CERCLA section 107(a)(1) 10 makes the cur-
rent owner liable and section 107(a)(2)11 makes the owner at the
time of the release of pollutants liable. CERCLA does not, how-
ever, impose absolute liability on an owner; it provides owners
with two narrow, limited exemptions from liability-one styled
the third-party defense, and the other the "innocent purchaser"
defense. 12 The first exemption provides that there shall be no lia-
bility for a person otherwise liable where the release and resulting
damages:
[Wiere caused solely by... an act or omission of a third party
other than an employee or agent of the defendant, or than one
whose act or omission occurs in connection with a contractual
relationship, existing directly or indirectly, with the defendant
... if the defendant establishes by a preponderance of evidence
that (a) he exercised due care with respect to the hazardous sub-
stance . . . in light of all relevant facts and circumstances, and
(b) he took precautions against foreseeable acts or omissions of
any such third party and the consequences that could
foreseeably result from such acts or omissions. 13
The second exemption, the innocent purchaser defense, re-
quires proof of all the elements applicable to the third-party de-
fense and proof that the owner bought the property after the
release, as well as requiring that the owner did not know and had
no reason to know that any hazardous substance had been re-
leased.1 4 The questions pertinent here are: (i) whether a tenant
8. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2001).
9. See Barlo Equip., 215 F.3d at 326-27; see also Bedford Affiliates v. Sills, 156
F.3d 416, 423 (2d Cir. 1998).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1) (2001).
11. Id. § 9607(a)(2).
12. Id. § 9607(b).
13. Id. § 9607(b)(3).
14. Id. § 9601(35)(A). CERCLA contains two other exemptions: act of God, § 9607
(b)(1) and act of war, § 9607(b)(2), neither of which is relevant to this article.
2001]
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may be subjected to "owner" liability as an "owner" within the
meaning of the statute; (ii) what makes an "owner" innocent
under the statute; and (iii) whether a party made statutorily liable
may receive indemnification or contribution from other parties.
I. Ownership Status: Can A Tenant Be An "Owner" Within
The Meaning Of The Statute?
Ownership is sufficient to trigger CERCLA liability, this even
though the statute provides limited exceptions. But, what about
CERCLA liability of a lessee? Can the lessee be liable just be-
cause it is the lessee? The answer is yes. When the lessee exer-
cises those rights that normally vest an "owner." This situation
typically occurs it the net lease context, where the owner holds
bare title and all other rights and responsibilities for the property
fall to the lesssee.
In Commander Oil Corp. v. Barlo Equipment Corp.,15 the is-
sue was whether owner-landlord liability automatically attaches
to a lessee-sublessor where the sublessee causes contamination.
The action arose in the following factual context: In 1963, Com-
mander bought two adjoining parcels. 16 The first parcel housed
an office and warehouse; the second housed twelve above ground
petroleum storage tanks.1 7 In 1964, Commander leased the office
and warehouse to Barlo; five years later, Commander leased the
petroleum tank parcel to Pasley Solvents. In 1972, under a single
new lease, Commander leased both parcels to Barlo, which in turn
subleased the petroleum tank parcel to Pasley.'8 Under the new
arrangement, Barlo, the tenant, was responsible for basic mainte-
nance and taxes for both parcels.1 9 The outcome of the action
turned on who, among the landlord, tenant and subtenant, main-
tained control over the contaminated first parcel and to what
degree.20
In analyzing that issue, the Second Circuit revisited the CER-
CLA definitions of an "owner" and "operator" of a contaminated
facility and the interpretive gloss that the case law had given
those definitions. Relying on one of its own recent decisions, the
court observed, "[o]wner and operator liability should be treated
15. 215 F.3d 321 (2d Cir. 2000).
16. Id. at 324.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 324-25.
20. Id. at 326.
[Vol. 19
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol19/iss1/2
ALLOCATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL RISK
separately."21  The court also relied on United States v.
Bestfoods,22 where the Supreme Court had held, "an operator
must manage, direct, or conduct operations specifically related to
pollution, that is, operations having to do with the leakage or dis-
posal of hazardous waste, or decisions about compliance with envi-
ronmental regulations. '23 In holding that Barlo, the lessee-
sublessor, was not an "owner" within the meaning of the statute,
the court reasoned that a lessee-sublessor's concern about envi-
ronmental hazards on a site is usually limited to ensuring "[tihat
the property is adequate for the tenant's purposes and that there
are no on-site environmental conditions or features which would
impair the tenant's ability to operate."24
A prime example, said the Second Circuit, of a situation
where a lessee-sublessor could be found strictly liable as an
"owner" for contamination of a leased site, is the long term, net
lease.25 The court proposed the following non-exclusive list of fac-
tors that might transform a lessee into an owner:
(1) whether the lease is for an extensive term and admits of no
rights in the owner/lessor to determine how the property is
used; (2) whether the lease cannot be terminated by the owner
before it expires by its terms; (3) whether the lessee has the
right to sublet all or some of the property without notifying the
owner; (4) whether the lessee is responsible for payment of all
taxes, assessments, insurance, and operation and maintenance
costs; and (5) whether the lessee is responsible for making all
structural and other repairs. 26
The court stressed that the key question is whether the
lessee's status is that of a de facto owner and not whether it exer-
cises control over the polluting facility.27 In other words, the criti-
21. Barlo Equip., 215 F.3d at 328. See also Schiavone v. Pearce, 79 F.3d 248, 254
(2d Cir. 1996) (observing that "'owner' liability and 'operator' liability denote two sep-
arate concepts, courts stress the disjunctive character of CERCLA liability." (quoting
Lansford-Coaldale Joint Water Auth. v. Tonolli, 4 F.3d 1209, 1220 (3d Cir. 1993))).
22. 524 U.S. 51 (1998).
23. Id. at 66-67.
24. Barlo Equip., 215 F.3d at 330 (quoting Richard D. Jones & Ivan S. DeVoren,
Managing Environmental Risks in Commercial Real Estate Leases, SA81 A.L.I.-
A.B.A. 121, 126 (1996)).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 330-31. See also United States v. A & N Cleaners & Launderers, Inc.,
788 F. Supp. 1317, 1332-34 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (discussing factors characteristic of
ownership).
27. Barlo Equip., 215 F.3d at 331.
2001]
5
54 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
cal relationship is that between the owner/lessor and the lessee/
sublessor, not that between the lessee/sublessor and the subles-
see.28 In the court's view, for example, a sale-leaseback arrange-
ment does not insulate the seller/lessee from owner's liability if
the seller/lessee actually retains most rights of ownership with re-
spect to the buyer/lessor.29 Likewise, extremely long-term leases
may invest owners' liability in the lessee if the lease strips all
rights from the owner except bare title and confers on the lessee
all other indicia of ownership.30 A tenant in that class is a de facto
owner.31 An owner's liability might also lie where a lessee/subles-
sor has impermissibly exploited-by his own use or through a sub-
lease-more rights than he originally acquired through the lease,
effectively expropriating from the owner the right to benefit from
the activity on the property.32 Applying all of these criteria to the
facts, the court held that Commander retained significant control
and that therefore Barlo, the tenant-sublessor, was not an "owner"
and therefore not liable. 33
II. The Third-Party and Innocent Purchaser Defenses
Landlords invariably seek to escape CERCLA liability, claim-
ing that their tenants or subtenants actually caused the release of
hazardous substances and that, accordingly, the landlords are in-
nocent of any wrongdoing, and should therefore escape liability.
But, as one court has noted:
To be innocent in a CERCLA response cost suit, one must be
innocent in the eyes of the law. To be ignorant of the contami-
nated condition of one's property may be a generic form of inno-
cence, but not the kind that will escape liability under the
statute.34
However, CERCLA does not impose absolute liability on a
landlord simply because it owns the property. The landlord is a
potentially responsible party because of its very ownership of the






33. Barlo, 215 F.3d at 331.
34. Bedford Affiliates v. Sills, 156 F.3d 416, 419 (2d Cir. 1998).
35. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1), (a)(2).
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landlord with defenses. The two principal ones are, as noted
above, the third-party defense 36 and the innocent purchaser de-
fense.3 7 However, the courts have narrowly construed these de-
fenses, meaning that very few "owners" fall within their
parameters and thereby benefit from them.38
New York v. Lashins Arcade Co.,39 represents a rare instance
in which a landlord received asylum under the third-party de-
fense. The main defendant, owned a shopping center located in
Bedford, New York which it had purchased from one Baygell, who
had in turn purchased from one Cushman. 40 Cushman had leased
one of the stores in the center to a dry cleaning establishment. 41
That tenancy, and the site's use as a dry cleaning store, ceased
while Cushman still owned the property. 42
During Baygell's ownership, New York State began an inves-
tigation of the site because of high levels of chemicals, associated
with dry cleaning, in the ground water surrounding the prop-
erty.43 Baygell, aware of the State's activities, placed the property
on the market, and sold it to Lashins, but never told the latter
about the environmental problems facing the center.44 Before ac-
quiring title, Lashins contacted the shopping center's water ser-
vice contractor, the Town of Bedford, and the center's tenants,
none of whom informed Lashins of the pendency of a State investi-
gation into the quality of the water. 45 After Lashins acquired ti-
tle, the State, now joined by the United States Environmental
Protection Agency, sued Lashins, among others, under CER-
CLA.4 6 Lashins sought to avoid liability by raising the third-party
defense.4 7 The court analyzed each of the elements of that defense
and agreed with Lashins that, in fact, he was not responsible for
the contamination. 48
36. See id. § 9607(b)(3).
37. Id. § 9601(35)(A).
38. See, e.g., New York v. Lashins Arcade Co., 91 F.3d 353 (2d Cir. 1996); United
States v. A & N Cleaners & Launderers, Inc., 788 F. Supp. 1317 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
39. 91 F.3d 353 (2d Cir. 1996).




44. Id. at 356-57.
45. Lashins Arcade, 91 F.3d at 357.
46. Id. at 358.
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First, the court concluded that Lashins had no contractual re-
lationship, either directly or indirectly, with the dry cleaning te-
nants, the ones who had actually caused the release of the
hazardous substances, since the dry cleaning tenants had de-
parted from the center more than a decade before Lashins boughtit.49
The court found Lashins' contractual relationship with
Baygell unavailing to deprive Lashins of the third-party defense. 50
The court cited its own prior holding in Westwood Pharmaceuti-
cals, Inc. v. National Fuel Gas Distribution Corp.51 for the proposi-
tion that the contract must relate to the hazardous activity.52
Thus, a contract between an owner and a tenant-a lease-for a
dry cleaning premises would relate to hazardous activity because
of the very nature of the dry cleaning business.5 3 But, a mere con-
tract to buy and sell real property, without more, was insufficient
as a contractual relationship under CERCLA to bar the use of the
third-party defense.54
Next, the court turned to the second element of the third-
party defense-namely, that the "owner" has "taken adequate pre-
cautions against the third party that would lead to a release of
hazardous waste."55 It noted that the last release had occurred
more than fifteen years before Lashins' purchase of the shopping
center and that therefore, Lashins could have done nothing to pre-
vent that release.56
The court then focused on the third element-that is,
"whether Lashins had exercised due care with respect to the haz-
ardous substance considered in light of all relevant facts and cir-
cumstances."57 The court found that Lashins had acted properly,
because Lashins had made proper and substantial inquiry before
acquiring title.58
49. Id.
50. Id. at 360.
51. 964 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1992).
52. Lashins Arcade, 91 F.3d at 360.
53. It is of some interest that a substantial percentage of the reported cases con-
cern dry cleaning establishments.
54. Lashins Arcade, 91 F.3d at 360.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 360-61.
58. Id. at 362.
[Vol. 19
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Finally, the court rejected the State's argument that Lashins
had acted improperly because it had failed to pay a portion of the
investigation costs. Said the court:
This is surely an anomalous proposal. Response costs are as-
sessed when there is liability under § 9607(a). It is counterin-
tuitive to suppose that defendant is required to pay some or all
of those response costs in order to establish the affirmative de-
fenses provided by § 9607(b)(3) to liability under § 9607(a),
thereby rendering the affirmative defense partly or entirely
academic. 59
The result in Lashins warrants comparison to that in United
States v. A & N Cleaners & Launderers, Inc.60 In A & N Cleaners,
the court held that the lessee of a shopping center bore "owner"
liability under CERCLA because of the substantial control over
the center that the lessee maintained. 61 The lessee's sublessee, a
dry cleaning operation, had released hazardous chemicals into the
groundwater surrounding the shopping center. 62 The court
barred the sublessor from taking refuge in the third-party defense
because it had a contract, for example, a lease, with a dry cleaning
establishment. 63 In addition, the court barred the lessee from in-
voking the innocent purchaser defense because it had purchased
the property before the release of the hazardous substances had
ceased.64
III. Indemnification and Contribution.
1. Statutory
CERCLA provides a party cast in primary liability with a
means to obtain compensation from other potentially responsible
parties.65 Indemnity arises from 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B), under
which a party expending funds to respond to a release may recover
its expenditures from the owner or operator of the real property.
Contribution arises from 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f), which allows a per-
son liable for response cost liability to recover contribution from
59. Id. at 361.
60. 788 F. Supp. 1317 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
61. Id. at 1332-34.
62. Id. at 1321.
63. Id. at 1326-29.
64. Id. at 1329-30.
65. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(e)(2) (2001).
2001]
9
58 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
others potentially so responsible. The allocation is made "using
such equitable factors as the court determines are appropriate."
66
A central issue is whether a person strictly liable as an owner
may have statutory indemnification from the actual polluter, who
is often a subtenant. In Bedford Affiliates v. Sills, 67 the court an-
swered that question, barring a potentially responsible party from
obtaining statutory indemnification, but allowing statutory contri-
bution. 68 There, the sublessee caused the release of hazardous
substances during the term of the sublease, of which release the
owner was unaware until after the sublessee assigned its sublease
to a third party. 69 Subsequently, the landowner terminated the
lease and sublease. 70 Through its dealing with governmental
agencies over the issue of remediation and clean up of the contam-
inated site, the landowner incurred substantial expenses and at-
tempted to recoup some of them. The court held that CERCLA
and the Reauthorization Act of 1986 ("SARA"), provide two legal
avenues for a private party to recoup some or all of the costs asso-
ciated with an environmental cleanup: A cost recovery action
under CERCLA section 9607(a) and a contribution action under
CERCLA section 9613(f)(1). 71 The court held that the landowner
cannot pursue section 9607(a) cost recovery, that is, indemnifica-
tion, claims against the lessee and sublessee due to its very owner-
ship of the site and, thus, its status as a potentially responsible
party under CERCLA.72 It viewed the landlord, the tenant and
the subtenant as potentially responsible parties under the act.
73
Thus, one of them, as a statutory joint tortfeasor, can never re-
cover 100% of the response costs from other similarly situated par-
ties and must ultimately bear its pro rata share of cleanup costs. 74
However, the court read 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) to allow a first joint
tortfeasor to seek contribution from other joint tortfeasors for the
share of cleanup costs exceeding that first joint tortfeasor's equita-
ble share of the aggregate expenditure.75
66. Bedford Affiliates v. Sills, 156 F.3d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1998).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 424, 432.
69. Id. at 420.
70. Id. at 421.
71. Id. at 423.
72. Bedford Affiliates, 156 F.3d at 423-25 (construing 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)
(2001)).
73. Id. at 423
74. Id. at 425.
75. Id. at 427.
[Vol. 19
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2. Contractual
CERCLA directly, but somewhat ambiguously, addresses con-
tractual indemnification. It recites:
No indemnification, hold harmless, or similar agreement or con-
veyance shall be effective to transfer from the owner or operator
of any vessel or facility or from any person who may be liable for
a release or threat of release under this section, to any other
person the liability imposed under this section. Nothing in this
subsection shall bar any agreement to insure, hold harmless, or
indemnify a party to such agreement for any liability under this
section.7 6
The courts have interpreted this section to bar a party cast in
primary liability from foisting that primary liability on another
party, but courts have also interpreted it to allow the party prima-
rily liable to recover from others. 77 Thus, no contract can stop the
federal government from holding a party primarily liable, but
rather, a properly drawn contract can allow a party primarily lia-
ble to recover its costs and expenses from another.
The courts, however, construe indemnification clauses strictly
against the putative indemnitee. 78 The Bedford Affiliates court
construed the contractual indemnification that the sublessee had
given the lessee. In pertinent part, the sublease provided that the
sublessee became obligated to "forever indemnify and save harm-
less [the sublessor] for and against any and all liability, penalties,
damages, expenses and judgments arising from injury... [to the
site], occasioned wholly or in part by [the sublessee]."79 The Sec-
ond Circuit found this broad indemnification language sufficient
to warrant the sublessee's indemnification of the lessee.80 The
sublessee's activities, it should be remembered, were the actual
cause of the release.
In Commander Oil Corp. v. Advance Food Service Equip-
ment,8 ' the Second Circuit also had occasion to construe a contrac-
tual indemnity clause. Simultaneously with the closing of a sale
pursuant to an asset purchase agreement, the seller and buyer
76. 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (e)(1) (2001).
77. See, e.g., Harley Davidson, Inc. v. Minstar, Inc., 41 F.3d 341, 342-43 (7th Cir.
1994); John J. Boyd Co. v. Boston Gas Co., 992 F.2d 401, 405 (1st Cir. 1993).
78. See Bedford Affiliates, 156 F.3d at 431.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. 991 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1993).
2001]
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entered into a long-term lease of certain real property, with the
seller becoming the landlord and the buyer becoming the tenant.8 2
The property had become contaminated before the date of closing,
and subsequent to the sale of the business, the seller/landlord im-
pleaded the buyer/tenant in order to seek indemnification for
CERCLA environmental response costs.8 3
Both the asset purchase agreement and the lease contained
indemnification language; in pertinent part, the asset purchase
agreement provided: "At the Closing, Seller shall assign and
transfer to Buyer and Buyer shall assume and agree to pay, per-
form and discharge and indemnify Seller against... [certain] con-
tingent liabilities. . . ."84 The asset purchase agreement listed the
contingent liabilities as follows: "All litigation disclosed [on an ex-
hibit] and all other litigations occurring from and after the date of
signing the [asset purchase] Agreement relating to the business
and assets being acquired hereunder. '8 5
The lease provided:
Tenant hereby agrees to defend, indemnify, and hold Landlord
harmless from and against any and all claims, losses, liabilities,
liens, damages and expenses (including, without limitation,
cleanup costs and reasonable attorneys' fees) arising directly or
indirectly from, out of, or by reason of an Environmental Law or
an Environmental Event affecting Tenant, its operations of the
premises. Such indemnification shall only include all claims...
[and] . . . losses ... incurred during the Term or after the expi-
ration or earlier termination of the Term if such claims, losses
etc. are the result of Tenant's actions or omissions during the
Term .... 86
The court concluded that the language of the two documents
was insufficiently specific to demonstrate that the parties had
clearly allocated environmental liabilities.8 7 It was unable to say
as a matter of law that the "and all other litigation" phrase of the
asset purchase agreement's indemnification provision unequivo-
cally demonstrated an "unmistakable intent to indemnify" the
seller/landlord for environmental liability.88 The court further
82. Id. at 50.
83. Id. at 51.
84. Id. at 52.
85. Id. (emphasis added).
86. Id.
87. Advance Food Serv., 991 F.2d at 52-55.
88. Id. at 54-55.
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol19/iss1/2
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held that, since under New York law, indemnification agreements
are strictly construed and courts may not find a duty to indemnify
absent manifestation of clear and unmistakable intent, "[t]he lan-
guage of the indemnification provisions in the Asset Purchase
Agreement when read in connection with the Lease is ambiguous
as a matter of law."8 9 Accordingly the Second Circuit remanded
the case to the district court to allow the parties to offer extrinsic
evidence bearing on the intent of the parties as to the tenant's
obligation to defend and indemnify.90
New York Oil Spill Litigation
A. The Statutory Background
The Oil Spill Act 91 ("Act") governs soil contamination caused
by leaking gasoline pumps and similar facilities for storage of pe-
troleum and petroleum products. The Act states, "the discharge of
petroleum is prohibited,"92 and defines "discharge" to mean: "Any
intentional or unintentional action or omission resulting in the re-
leasing, spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying or
dumping or petroleum into the waters of the state or on to lands
from which it might flow or drain into said water. .. ,,93 The Act
also assigns liability for petroleum discharges: "Any person who
has discharged petroleum shall be strictly liable, without regard
to fault, for all cleanup and removal costs and all direct and indi-
rect damages, no matter by whom sustained."94
Until 2001, most New York courts had held that the last pro-
vision imposes strict remediation liability on the owner of the con-
taminated property, whether or not that owner caused or
contributed to the contamination, even if the owner is wholly inno-
cent.95 Under that standard, a landowner was, without more,
strictly liable to remediate petroleum pollution produced on or
under his land. Some courts, however, focused on conduct, not
89. Id. at 55.
90. See id.
91. N.Y. NAv. LAW §§ 170-177 (McKinney 2001).
92. Id. § 173.
93. Id. § 172(8).
94. Id. § 181(1).
95. See, e.g., New York v. Tartan Oil Corp., 638 N.Y.S.2d 989 (N.Y. App. Div.
1996); John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. 491-499 Seventh Ave. Assocs., 644 N.Y.S.2d
953 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1996).
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status.96 In White v. Long,97 the Court of Appeals faced, but de-
clined to decide, whether mere ownership of land was sufficient to
render the owner absolutely liable under the Act.98 In New York
v. Green,99 the court finally answered that question, holding that
land ownership alone created no liability. 100 However, in the pro-
cess, it announced an exception to the rule so broad as to virtually
swallow up the rule itself.101
The decision arose in a typical context: Green, the tenant, had
leased a mobile home site from Lakeside, the landlord. 10 2 Green's
home used oil heat, supplied from an above ground oil tank that
she maintained. 03 The tank collapsed, spilling petroleum, and
the State cleaned up the discharge. Ultimately the State sued the
Green, Lakeside and the company that had supplied the oil and
serviced the tank. 04
Lakeside and the service company appeared, asserting cross-
claims for indemnity against each other, and against the Green,
who defaulted. 05 The thrust of Lakeside's defense lay in the as-
sertion that because it did not own, maintain or install the tank, it
was not a discharger under section 181(1) of the Act.' 06 After the
New York Appellate Division granted summary judgment to
Lakeside, the State appealed to the Court of Appeals, which re-
versed and granted summary judgment to the State. 10 7
The Court of Appeals' analysis focused on the landowner's
control over the activity leading to the spill. If the owner actually
controls the activity, or has the right to control the activity, it is
liable.'08 The court held:
[W]hile we refuse to impose liability based solely on ownership
of contaminated land, we nonetheless conclude that where, as
here, a landowner can control activities occurring on its prop-
96. See, e.g., Drouin v. Ridge Lumber, Inc., 619 N.Y.S.2d 433, 435 (N.Y. App. Div.
1994) ("Nothing in the statute could be construed as making a landowner responsible
solely because it is a landowner.").
97. 85 N.Y.2d 564 (N.Y. 1995).
98. Id. at 569-70.
99. 96 N.Y.2d 403 (N.Y. 2001).
100. Id. at 405.
101. Id. at 407-08.
102. Id. at 405.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Green, 96 N.Y.2d at 405.
106. Id. at 405-6.
107. Id. at 408.
108. Id. at 407-8.
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erty and has reason to believe that petroleum products will be
stored there, the landowner is liable as a discharger for the
cleanup costs.' 0 9
The court drew a distinction between a discharge by a tenant,
on the one hand, and a spill by a "midnight dumper" or an errant
oil truck, on the other.110 In the former case, the landlord could
obviously control the tenant's conduct via the lease, and therefore
would be liable."'l In the latter case, however, the landlord could
not exert control over the actor, and therefore would not face pri-
mary liability.1 2 Since, under the terms of the lease, the land-
lord, Lakeside, could exercise control over Green's, the tenant's,
conduct, the court held the landlord responsible in the first in-
stance as a discharger." 3 We believe that the cases in which a
tenant spills oil exceed exponentially those in which a errant oil
truck does so. In other words, the exception-control-is really
the rule.
B. Apportionment of Liability
Even if a landlord is liable as a discharger under the Act, may
that landlord obtain contribution or indemnification for clean-up
costs from other potentially responsible parties? Put another way,
may a landlord, made liable solely because of its contractual right
to regulate tenant conduct that results in an oil spill, seek to re-
cover its out-of-pocket expenses from that tenant? The answer is
unqualifiedly in the affirmative, whether from a statutory or a
contractual viewpoint.
1. Statutory Contribution
Green addressed a second issue: May a landlord, liable as a
discharger precisely because of its status as a landlord who could
control its tenant's activities, obtain contribution, under section
181(5) of the Act, from the actual discharger?"14 Noting that it
had previously held, in White v. Long, that the Act allowed more
than one party to be deemed a discharger, the court, in Green, ex-
tended its earlier expressed rationale and held that the one ini-
109. Id. at 405.
110. Id. at 407.
111. Green, 96 N.Y.2d at 407.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 408.
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tially made to pay-the landowner-may accordingly receive
recompense from the others. 115 The mere happenstance that the
State chooses to pursue one discharger, or several dischargers, but
not all, does not free the remaining dischargers from liability.
2. Contractual Burden-Shifting
Parties potentially responsible under the Act may shift liabil-
ity by contract. The analysis begins with the language of the
lease. In the contractual burden-shifting cases, courts tend to
hold that a mere clause under which the tenant agrees to comply
with applicable laws is insufficient to render the tenant liable.
There must be more. Thus, a compliance with law clause, com-
bined with evidence that the tenant's activity caused the contami-
nation, will render the tenant liable. Of course, a clause
containing stronger language-for example, one shifting all liabil-
ity to the tenant (as is commonly found in a net lease)-will also
render the tenant liable. As we will see, contractual burden shift-
ing can even trump statutory contribution.
In analyzing the contractual obligations of parties to written
agreements, such as leases, courts adhere to the "four corners doc-
trine."1 16 When a written contract is clear and complete, the court
should enforce the writing according to the terms appearing
within its four corners. 117 "Evidence outside the four corners of
the document [that is, extrinsic or parol evidence] as to what was
really intended but unstated or misstated is generally inadmissi-
ble to add to or vary the writing."118 In short, whether a particu-
lar writing is ambiguous is a question of law . ..."119
In Bush Terminal Associates v. Federated Deptartment
Stores,120 an early decision concerning the allocation of environ-
mental risk, the New York Appellate Division had to assign, as
between landlord and tenant, the financial burden of constructing
sewer lines, a project made necessary by directive of the Environ-
mental Protection Agency ("EPA"), which had found that the
building was improperly discharging raw sewage into the
Gowanus Canal and New York Bay.121 The landlord had net
115. See id. (citing White v. Long, 85 N.Y.2d 564, 569 (N.Y. 1995))
116. See, e.g., W.W.W. Assocs., Inc. v. Giancontieri, 77 N.Y.2d 157 (N.Y. 1990).
117. Id. at 162.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. 424 N.Y.S.2d 28 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980).
121. Bush Terminal, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 29. Bush Terminal did not arise in the con-
text of the Oil Spill Act, but its rationale applies to Oil Spill Act cases by analogy.
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leased the property to the tenant, meaning that the tenant was to
bear all expenses associated with the property's operation. Gener-
ally, the court noted, "'[tihe obligation to comply with legal re-
quirements affecting real property is on its owner and absent an
express covenant to the contrary, the tenant has no obligation to
undertake significant structural alterations."122 Specifically, the
lease in question allowed the tenant to use the building for any
legal purposes and provided further in pertinent part:
Throughout the term of this Lease, Tenant, at Tenant's sole cost
and expense, shall promptly remove any violation caused by
Tenant and shall, with respect to the manner and use by Tenant
of the Demised Premises, promptly comply with any and all pre-
sent and future laws and ordinances which may affect or be ap-
plicable to the Demised Premises or any part thereof, or ... to
the use or manner of use of the Demised Premises or any part
thereof, or the owners, tenants, or occupants thereof, whether or
not any such violation or any such law, ordinances, order, rule,
regulation or requirement shall necessitate structural changes
required by reason of the manner of Tenant's use of the Demised
Premises . . . and whether or not the correction or removal so
necessitated shall have been foreseen or unforeseen or whether
the same shall involve radical or extraordinary construction or
other disposition, provided such violation or order results from
the character of the Tenant's manner of conducting its business
in use of the Demised Premises, Tenant's manner of conducting
its business in the Demised Premises, or Tenant's failure to
maintain the Demised Premises and the equipment therein ...
and keep in good order and condition pursuant to the terms of
this Lease. 123
The court absolved the tenant from liability for the cost of
complying with the EPA requirement. It reasoned that the pollu-
tion would have occurred no matter whether the defendant tenant
or another tenant occupied the building.124 The court noted:
"Rather than resulting from the character of defendant's use of
the premises, any occupancy of the premises, by any tenant, would
have required the installation of a new sewer system."125 That the
lease was a "net lease" did not sway the court; instead, the court
concluded that the quoted language placed the obligation on the
122. Id. at 29-30. (quoting 2 FRIEDMAN ON LEASES, § 11.1 (1997)).
123. Id. at 29 (emphasis added).
124. Id. at 30.
125. Id.
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landlord because nothing in the particular character of the ten-
ant's use had created the contaminating condition. 126
In 101 Fleet Place Associates v. New York Telephone Co.,127
the court had to allocate the responsibility for remedying damage
caused by gasoline leaking from deteriorated underground storage
tanks and connected pipes used in the conduct of the tenant's bus-
iness. In contrast to the usual situation in which the tenant
agrees to comply with all laws, the landlord had assumed that ob-
ligation.128 The long term net lease provided:
The landlord at his sole expense shall comply with all laws, or-
ders and regulations of federal, state, county and with any pro-
ceeding of any public officer or officers, pursuant to law, which
shall impose any violation, order or duty upon landlord or ten-
ant with respect to demised premises or the use or occupation
thereof.129
The lease also required the tenant to "keep and maintain the
exterior of demised garage building in a good state of preservation
and repair."130 The court held that that latter provision did not,
absent an explicit inclusion of repair or replacement of under-
ground gasoline tanks, override the specific former provision,
thereby making the landlord solely financially responsible for re-
pairs of governmental compliance and structural repairs. 3 1
The court then turned to a second issue. Having determined
that the lease placed the obligation on the landlord to pay for the
repairs, would the court allow the landlord to maintain a statu-
tory cause of action for contribution against the tenant? The court
said no.' 32 Quoting from Olin Corp. v. Consolidated Aluminum
Corp.,133 a case arising out of contractual burden-shifting of CER-
CLA obligations between buyer and seller of real property, the
court noted:
We acknowledge that this is a seemingly harsh result for a com-
pany that must pay for the cleanup of contamination that it ap-
parently did not cause. However, we are unwilling to ignore the
126. Id.
127. 609 N.Y.S.2d 896 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994).
128. Id. at 898.
129. Id. at 897-98 (emphasis added).
130. Id. at 898.
131. Id.
132. See id.
133. 5 F.3d 10, 18-19 (2d Cir. 1993).
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broad inclusive language of agreements freely entered into by
two sophisticated parties. Parties should be able to rely on the
terms of an agreement arrived at after arduous negotiations.13 4
Thus, at least as between a landlord and tenant, statutory contri-
bution is unavailable where their lease unambiguously places the
clean up burden on one of the parties.
In Star Nissan, Inc. v. Frishwasser,135 the court, as in 101
Fleet Place, had to determine whether the lease language was
broad enough to fix liability on the net lessee. In contrast to the
lease clause at issue in 101 Fleet Place, the court said the one at
issue in Star Nissan was sufficiently specific and inclusive to war-
rant imposition of liability on the tenant. 36
The action had its genesis in a sale and leaseback transaction.
A corporation had sold commercial property to purchasers who
then leased the property back to a principal in the corporation. 37
Later, the principal's successor-in-interest subleased a portion of
the property to a subtenant. 138 The seller-lessee had used the
property to conduct a car dealership and its service department,
and the subtenant also used the property for that purpose. When
petroleum was discovered beneath the property's surface, the
landlord, tenant and subtenant became embroiled in a dispute
over who, among them, would bear the burden to pay for
remediation.139
The court began its analysis by reviewing the lease, and con-
cluded that the subtenants were liable. 40 The court examined
two paragraphs of the lease, the first of which read in pertinent
part:
This lease is a net lease,... [which] shall be construed to impose
upon the Tenant, as though it were the sole owner of the prem-
ises, all costs . . . and obligations of every kind relating to or
arising out of the premises or the use thereof, including the cost
and expense of interior and exterior repairs, both ordinary and
134.. 101 Fleet Place Assocs., 609 N.Y.S.2d at 898.
135. 677 N.Y.S.2d 145 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998). This case was successfully argued
before the Appellate Division by one of the authors of this article.
136. Id. at 147.
137. Id. at 146.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 147.
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extraordinary, which may arise or become due during or out of
the term of this lease.' 4 '
The second paragraph required the tenant to "comply with all pre-
sent and future laws."'1 42
These lease provisions, the court held, shifted all burdens as-
sociated with ownership of the premises, including the obligation
to remediate underground oil contamination, as mandated by the
Act, to the tenant. 143 In contradistinction to 101 Fleet Place, the
language of the lease mentioned nothing about pollution caused
by the character of the tenant's business operation, but instead
placed on the tenant all costs and obligations, as though the ten-
ant was the property's sole owner. Even though Star Nissan pre-
ceded the no-automatic-liability-for-owners standard announced
in Green, the tenant would still have liability because of the broad
burden-shifting language of the lease.144 Another observation is
that the tenant's peculiar use of the premises as an automobile
sales and servicing site quite obviously influenced the court even
though it was not specifically discussed in the decision. 145 Finally,
the court held that "the sublease, by virtue of the language requir-
ing the subtenant to 'bear all charges which the Prime Tenant is
required to bear under the Master Lease,' imposed equivalent ob-
ligations on the subtenant." 46
To summarize, an owner is not automatically liable as a dis-
charger to remediate oil pollution just because it is an owner, but
the exceptions swallow up the rule. However, the owner may have
statutory contribution or contractual indemnity from its tenant, in
that statutory contribution is based on relative fault and contrac-
tual indemnity on the scope of the contract.
New York City Asbestos Litigation
In 1985, New York City enacted Local Law No. 76 which "re-
quires, among other things, that the presence and condition of as-
bestos be ascertained before any building alteration or demolition
is performed; that asbestos be removed or encapsulated if such
work will cause asbestos to become airborne; and that all asbestos
141. Star Nissan, 677 N.Y.S.2d at 147 (emphasis added).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. See 101 Fleet Place Assocs. v. New York Telephone Co., 609 N.Y.S.2d 896, 898
(N.Y. App. Div. 1994).
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abatement activities be conducted in accordance with approved
safety procedures .... -147 The law does not require removal of
undisturbed asbestos or asbestos that will not be disturbed by al-
teration or demolition. 148
The issue that often arises is whether the tenant or landlord
must bear costs associated with asbestos removal. In general, the
courts have held tenants liable where the lease squarely and un-
equivocally places responsibility for remediation on the tenant or,
absent such explicit language, where the lease requires the tenant
to comply with all laws and the tenant's peculiar use of the prem-
ises implicates asbestos, liability will fall to the tenant.149
In Wolf v. 2539 Realty Associates, a commercial tenant sued
its landlord for a judgment declaring that the landlord bore re-
sponsibility to remedy asbestos conditions in the demised prem-
ises. 150 In determining the allocation of the responsibilities
between the landlord and tenant, the court relied on the lease's
separate repair and compliance-with-law clauses and concluded
that responsibility remained with the landlord. 151 Based upon its
review, the court held: (a) the repair clause, requiring the tenant
to "keep the interior of the demised premises in good order and
repair," failed to shift to the tenant the burden of removing asbes-
tos-containing material covering steel structural members be-
cause the asbestos hazard was not a condition in need of "repair"
within the meaning of the lease, in that remedial measures were
not necessitated by any damage or wear, but by a supervening
change in governmental policy;' 52 and (b) the compliance-with-law
clause, which required the tenant to comply with the laws, regula-
tions and directions of public officer "with respect to tenant's use
and occupancy of the demised premises," failed to shift to the ten-
ant the burden of abating the asbestos condition because this
clause was designed to protect the landlord against assumption
only of those burdens which might be imposed by the necessity to
comply with laws and regulations governing the tenant's particu-
lar use of the premises. 53 Where the premises could not safely be
147. See Kaufman v. City of New York, 891 F.2d 446,446 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. de-
nied, 495 U.S. 957 (1990) (interpreting N.Y. CiTY LocAL LAW No. 76 (1985)).
148. Id.
149. See, e.g., Wolf v. 2539 Realty Assocs., 560 N.Y.S.2d 24 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990);
Linden Blvd., L.P. v. Elota Realty Co., 601 N.Y.S.2d 949 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993).
150. 560 N.Y.S.2d 24 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990).
151. Id. at 27-28.
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put to any use without removal of asbestos, the need to comply
with a directive to remove the asbestos simply did not arise out of
the tenant's particular use of the premises and thus was not the
tenant's responsibility. 5 4
Similarly, in Linden Boulevard, L.P. v. Elota Realty Co.,155 a
commercial tenant sued its landlord and former landlord to re-
cover costs of asbestos removal. The lease contained a compli-
ance-with-law clause placing on the tenant responsibility for the
cost of complying with all governmental regulations applicable to
the demised premises whether or not the regulations required
structural changes and improvements, "provided that the duty to
effect the necessary structural changes ... shall only be the duty
of the Tenant if the changes are required because of the use to
which the Demised Premises are put by the Tenant."156 The court
absolved the tenant from responsibility for asbestos removal be-
cause the required removal arose out of municipal enactments and
bore no relation to tenant's use of the demised premises, since the
removal would have been required for use of the building by any
tenant. 157
In Rapid-American. Corp. v. 888 7th Ave. Associates,158 a ten-
ant of twenty floors of an office tower sued to recover costs in-
curred in removal of asbestos-containing material. Under the
lease, the tenant had the right to sublet portions of the demised
premises to various subtenants, which it routinely did over a pe-
riod of years, often renovating the sublet space to meet the given
subtenant's needs. 159 The relevant provision of the lease recited:
Tenant. . . at its expense shall comply with all laws and require-
ments of public authorities which shall, with respect to the use
and occupancy of the Demised Premises, or the abatement of
any nuisance, impose any violation, order or duty on Landlord
or Tenant, arising from (i) Tenant's use of the Demised Prem-
ises, (ii) the manner of conduct of Tenant's business or operation
of its installations, equipment or other property therein, (iii) any
cause or condition created by or at the instance of Tenant, other
than by Landlord's performance of any work for or on behalf of
154. Id. at 28.
155. 601 N.Y.S.2d 949 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993).
156. Id. at 951-52.
157. Id. at 952.
158. 574 N.Y.S.2d 447 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991).
159. Id. at 448.
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Tenant, or (iv) breach of any of Tenant's obligations here-
under. 160
The court held that the cost of asbestos removal performed
during tenant's renovation work was to be borne by the landlord,
under general principles of law and the terms of the lease, even
though the lease had made the tenant responsible for structural or
other substantial changes required by its use of the premises. 161
The court reasoned that where the tenant's ongoing use of the
premises to sublet office space was the very use contemplated by
the lease, the condition was created by use of asbestos containing
material as fire proofing; the duty to remove asbestos arose out of
a change in governmental policy, rather than out of tenant's use of
the premises. 162 Finally, it also reasoned that since the tenant
had no option to purchase, nor did it occupy the entire building,
the lessor would ultimately reap the reward of the asbestos re-
moval via increased value of the building. 63
Summary
With very limited exception, the owner of contaminated real
property is the primary source of funds for response costs. If the
owner is cast in liability, the owner may have the right to seek
statutory contribution or contractual indemnity against a party
that actually caused the pollution. Indeed, if the lease is drawn
properly, the landlord may receive full indemnification of from the
tenant even if the tenant did not cause the contamination. Thus,
potential tenants are well advised to investigate environmental is-
sues before leasing and to negotiate indemnification lease clauses
carefully, lest they assume liability for conditions that they do not
cause, and of which they are unaware.
160. Id. at 449.
161. Id. at 452.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 453.
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